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I. This Court should reverse the District Court's decision because the totality of the 
evidence, construed in the light most favorable to H20, shows that at the outset of the 
Payroll Contract, Proimtu purposefully availed itself to conducting business in the 
state of Idaho. 
The District Court's decision should be reversed because it was based on the incorrect 
conclusion that the performance of the Payroll Contract in Idaho was the result ofH20's unilateral 
acts. In reaching this conclusion, the District Court failed to consider the totality of the 
circumstances and failed to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to H20. In Proimtu's 
opposition brief, it invites this Court to repeat those errors. For the reasons that follow, this Court 
should reject such invitation and hold that due process allows an Idaho court to exercise specific 
personal jurisdiction over Proimtu for its failure to reimburse H20 for money advanced to pay 
Proimtu' s taxes under a Payroll Contract that Proimtu knew would be performed in Idaho. 
A. H20's performance of the Payroll Contract in Idaho was not a unilateral act 
because, prior to the commencement of the Payroll Contract, Proimtu knew that 
H20 would administer the Payroll Contract in Boise and that Proimtu's payroll 
would be distributed through a Boise bank branch. 
This Court can and should reject Proimtu' s argument and authority that the unilateral acts 
of H20 caused the Payroll Contract to be performed in Boise because the evidence, construed in 
the light most favorable to H20 establishes that Proimtu knew, prior to entering into the Payroll 
Contract, that it would be performed in Boise. In S. Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & 
Supply, Inc., 98 Idaho 495, 567 P.2d 1246 (1977), this Court made clear that once an out of state 
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a 
Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 
90 L. Ed. 95 (1945)) is satisfied. Proimtu has failed to address this authority. 
The facts presented in this case, when construed in the light most favorable to H20, show 
that Promimtu was aware that the Payroll Contract would be performed in Idaho and, further, that 
Proimtu would be availing itself to the protections of the laws of the state ofldaho because Proimtu 
was using Idaho banks to carry out the terms of the Payroll Contract. After it learned that payroll 
would be administered from Boise (which was prior to commencement of the Payroll Contract), 
Proimtu could have elected to use a different payroll administrator. Similarly, when Proimtu 
learned that payments for performance of the Payroll Contract would be distributed through a 
Boise bank branch (which, again, was prior to the commencement of the Payroll Contract), 
Proimtu could have asked that H20 use a bank located elsewhere. Proimtu did neither of these 
things. Knowing that the Payroll Contract would be administered in Boise and knowing that the 
payments for performance of the Payroll Contract would be distributed through a Boise bank 
branch, Proimtu knowingly agreed to those terms and started performing under the Payroll 
Contract by purposefully availing itself to Idaho's banking system. Contrary to the authority upon 
which Proimtu relies, this was not a unilateral act undertaken by H20 after the Payroll Contract 
commenced. Accordingly, Proimtu's "unilateral act" argument can and should be rejected by this 
Court. 
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court not construing the totality of the evidence 
an extent contacts to get 
Court to consider the various acts establishing jurisdiction in isolation, rather than in their totality. 
Respondent Answer Brief, p. 11. However, when Proimtu's contacts with Idaho are considered in 
their totality, and construed in the light most favorable to H20, the evidence establishes that 
Proimtu has sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Idaho to satisfy the requirements of 
specific jurisdiction. 
Specifically, H20 presented three evidentiary bases that combine to demonstrate Proirntu 
had sufficient minimum contacts with the state. First, H20 showed the trial court that the signature 
line on Mr. Savre's email showed a Boise address. R. Vol. I, p. 36, ,1, p. 47-50. The trial court 
erred when it refused to construe this fact in favor ofH20 and, instead, found that such a signature 
line might not necessarily have given Proimtu notice or knowledge of Mr. Savre's physical 
location. Second, H20 put on evidence that Proimtu knew the Payroll Contract was performed in 
Boise because prior to commencement of the Payroll Contract, Proimptu received a W-9 with a 
Boise address, and notice that H20 would be using a Boise bank branch to process payroll. R. 
Vol. 1, p. 36, ,1, p. 37, ,12, p. 47-50, p. 51-53. Again, the trial court erred when it refused to 
construe this fact in favor of H20 and, instead, focused on the work performed in Tonapah under 
a different contract. The Payroll Contract at issue in this lawsuit was performed in Idaho and that 
fact cannot be changed by the fact of performance of a different contract outside of Idaho. Third, 
and finally, H20 presented evidence that Proimtu, on a weekly basis, mailed payroll information 
and funds to be processed by H20 and distributed through the Boise bank. R. Vol. I, p. 37,12, 
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as act 
was a term 
Contract, R. Vol. 1, p. 36, 17, p. 37, 112, p. 47-50, p. 51-53, entered into the Payroll Contract in 
November 2012, R. Vol. 1, p. 36, 14, and began the Payroll Contract in December 2012, R. Vol. 
1, p. 37, 114. Proimtu knew well in advance how and where the Payroll Contract would be 
administered and went forward. Accordingly, the "unilateral act" argument fails. 
These three acts should not be considered separately. Rather, they should be considered 
together, as part of the totality of the circumstances that give rise to Proimtu's purposeful availment 
of itself to Idaho. Moreover, these facts should be construed in the light most favorable to H20 
and the trial court's failure to do so is error. Knutsen v. Cloud, 142 Idaho 148, 150, 124 P.3d 1024, 
1026 (2005) (citing Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 74-75, 803 P.2d 978, 980-
81 (1990)) (explaining that the court must "construe the evidence presented to the district court in 
favor of the party opposing the order and accord that party the benefit of all inferences which might 
be reasonably drawn."). When all of the evidence is weighed at once and all reasonable inferences 
are drawn in favor ofH20, it is clear that Proimtu knew the work under the Payroll Contract was 
being performed in Idaho and that it was purposefully availing itself of the privilege of conducting 
business in Idaho, including using Idaho's banking system to distribute payroll funds to its 
employee. 
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should Proimtu's argument and authority that mere knowledge 
location is insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction because the 
evidence shows that Proimtu engaged in specific activity-sending money to Idaho 
and relying on an Idaho bank branch to distribute its payroll-that constitutes 
purposeful availment to the state. 
Proimtu relies on myriad cases that hold, "the defendant's awareness of the location of the 
plaintiff is not, on its own, enough to create personal jurisdiction over a defendant." Respondent 
Answer Brief, p. 11-12. However, as discussed in H20's opening brief and above, H20 does not 
rely solely on Proimtu' s awareness of H20' s physical location in making any of its jurisdictional 
arguments. 
Instead, H20 relies on Proimtu's weekly sending of payroll information and money to 
Idaho, combined with Proimtu's continuous and systematic use of an Idaho based bank to 
distribute payroll to its Tonapah employees. The affirmative acts of entering into a contract with 
a company located in Idaho to process payroll (including its federal Davis-Bacon reporting), 
sending money to an Idaho bank to fund said payroll, and using an Idaho bank to distribute said 
payroll constitutes, "some type of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the transaction of 
business within the forum state." Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008). 
Based on these facts, Proimtu purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in 
Idaho and it is appropriate for Proimtu to be hailed into Idaho for a lawsuit relating to that Payroll 
Contract. 
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specific personal jurisdiction over Proimtu under the circumstances 
this case comport traditional notions fair play and substantial 
Proimtu has failed to respond to H20's arguments and authority showing that exercise of 
specific personal jurisdiction over Proimtu in this case comports with traditional notions of fair 
piay and substantial justice. Instead, Proimtu attempts to circumvent the second prong of the 
analysis by relying on the case of Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron & Metal Co., 558 
F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1977), and arguing that exercising jurisdiction over a defendant would offend 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice where the "contracts at issue here were not 
to be performed in any part" within the forum state and thus have "no substantial connection" to 
the forum state. Respondent Answer Brief, p. 16. 
To make this argument Proimtu misrepresents the facts by focusing this Court's attention 
on Proimtu's contract to provide construction services in Nevada, rather than the at-issue Payroll 
Contract. Specifically, Proimtu incorrectly claims that, "this lawsuit involves a dispute ... 
involving the salaries of Nevada construction workers . . ." and that place of contractual 
performance was Nevada. Respondent Answer Brief, p. 16-17. That is simply not the case. This 
lawsuit involves Proimtu's failure to reimburse H20 for taxes H20 advanced on Proimtu's behalf 
while administering the Payroll Contract-a contract that was fully performed in Idaho. Proimtu 
continues this misdirection by misrepresenting that the substance of the Payroll Contract was to 
obtain Nevada workers. Respondent Answer Brief, p. 16. However, the record shows that H20's 
role was to conduct pre-employment screening of potential employees that Proimtu had selected, 
and that screening was conducted in Boise. R. Vol. 1, p. 37, ,r10. This Court should not be 
8 
Idaho. 
III. The District Court's decision to deny attorney fees and costs was proper because 
Proimtu failed to meet its burden of providing the District Court with the information 
necessary for it to make such an award. 
Proimtu's argument for reversing the trial court's decision to disallow Proimtu's request for 
costs fails to address the District Court's reasoning for disallowing such costs: namely, that the 
Statement of Costs submitted by Proimtu failed to comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 
and was, therefore, insufficient to allow any trial judge to make the proper assessment under 
I.R.C.P. 54. Proimtu's entire argument is directed at the mandatory nature of the fee award in this 
case, but fails to address the fact that Proimtu did not provide the trial court with adequate 
information for it to make such an award. 
Rule 54(d)(4) requires that a Statement of Costs itemizes each claimed expense. Proimtu's 
Statement of Costs included no itemization of any expense or costs but instead requested only 
attorney fees. R. Vol. 1, p. 160-168. In requesting attorney fees, the Statement of Costs lists time 
keepers John F. Daniels, Chris Byrd, Emily Ward, Brenoch Wirthlin, and Jessica Gale. Id. It does 
not, however, indicate whether these individuals are attorneys or paralegals, nor does it indicate 
the extent of their experience, education and ability. Id. Proimtu failed to provide the District 
Court with any information regarding the prevailing charges for like work or whether the requested 
rates were based on reasonable rates in the local market. Id. Finally, Proimtu did not present any 
arguments or evidence regarding the various factors set forth under LR.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A-L). 
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a reasonable and appropriate amount for an award 
of attorney fees, the Court must consider the factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(c)(3). 
Those factors include the "time and labor required," I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A); the 
"novelty and difficulty of the questions," I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(B); and the "prevailing 
charges for like work,"' I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(D). "[I]t is incumbent on the party 
seeking attorney foes to provide sufficient information for the court to consider 
[these] factors." Hackett v. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261,264, 706 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Ct. 
App. 1985). A Rule 54( d)( 5) memorandum of costs and a Rule 54( c )( 5) affidavit 
are "necessary for application of the Rule 54(e)(3) factors." Medical Recovery 
Services. Med. Recovery Servs., LLC, v. Jones, 145 Idaho 106, 110, 175 P.3d 795 
(Ct. App. 2007). 175 P.3d 795, 799 (Ct. App. 2007). Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5), 
a claim for attorney fees as costs "shall be supported by an affidavit of the attorney 
stating the basis and method of computation of the attorney fees claimed." In this 
case Defendant has provided a Statement or Costs which indicates hours worked 
and amounts charged by various individuals. However, there is no information 
regarding, for example, whether these individuals are attorneys or paralegals, their 
experience and ability, and the prevailing charges for like work. As the Court is 
without sufficient information to consider the factors set forth in 54( e )(3 ), Plaintiffs 
motion to disallow Defendant's request for costs is granted. 
R. Vol. 1, p. 248-249. 
Proimtu ignores these issues entirely. It instead focuses its briefing on the mandatory 
nature of the fee request, ignoring the actual holding of the trial court. The District Court's 
decision to grant H20' s motion to disallow Proimtu' s fee request must be upheld because Proimtu 
failed to meet its burden of providing the District Court with the information necessary for it to 
make an award. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the totality of the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to H20, 
demonstrates that Proimtu continuously and systematically sent information to be processed in 




performed in Idaho using an Idaho bank prior to entering into the Payroll Contract. The trial 
court's decision to dismiss this case for want of personal jurisdiction must be reversed. 
Finally, Proimtu failed to provide the trial court with the information necessary to make an 
award of fees. Accordingly, the order disallowing Proimtu's request for fees should be sustained. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of December, 2016. 
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
By 
Vau Fisher 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellant 
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